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Making Pets: Social Workers, "Problem Groups,"
and the Role of the SPCA-Getting a Little More
Precise About Racialized Narratives

Richard Delgado*
Introduction
No one (least of all I) could quarrel with the need to attend to the

rhetorical meaning of race in trying cases and representing clients.' We
need to understand the role of narrative, especially the racialized variety,
so that we may (1) appreciate the ways race determines outcomes in our
system of civil and criminal justice, (2) combat racialized narratives
colored by racism, and (3) understand the limits of what can be achieved
through advocacy. In a series of articles culminating in Race Trials,2
Anthony Alfieri has carried out pioneering work in each of these areas.
His readers are grateful for his work and contribution.
In this response, I offer additional reasons why we should applaud
Alfieri's inquiry into the rhetorical role of race 3-to allow jurisprudence
to accommodate changing social mores and prevent embarrassing and
obsolete decisions. I also suggest that we broaden the inquiry to address
civil as well as criminal trials4 and nonwhite groups other than African

* Jean Lindsley Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. J.D. 1974, University
of California at Berkeley.
1. See RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES (1995) (illustrating and arguing for an
expanded role for legal storytelling and narrative analysis); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for
Oppositionists and Others: A Pleafor Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411 (1989) (harmonizing and
endorsing the use of stories in the struggle for racial reform).
2. Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEXAS L. REv. 1293 (1998) [hereinafter Alfieri, Race
Trials]; see also Anthony V. Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racialized Defenses, 95
MICH. L. REv. 1063 (1997); Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REv.
1301 (1995).
3. Other writers have written in the same vein. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM
OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992); PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE
AND RIGHTS (1991); Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TExAS L. REV. 381 (1989). For
further works on this topic by the author, see CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTrING EDGE (R.
Delgado ed., 1995); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated
Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993).
4. See infra subpart 1(A).
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Americans.' My two points dovetail; the self-interest based reason I put
forward for studying the role of racialized narrative also supports the
expanded inquiry I outline.
I.

Interest Convergence: Why We Should Applaud and Further Alfieri's
Inquiry

In Race Trials, Anthony Alfieri urges that we attend, in a more
systematic way, to the rhetorical significance of race in the narratives we
use in representing clients and trying cases. He urges, for example, that
we "augment the still-evolving definition of race trials"6 and "broaden the
discursive map of 'race talk.'" 7 He envisions "weav[ing] multiple strands
of theoretical and practical analysis into a broad investigation of the status
of race, racialized narrative, and race-neutral representation in law,
lawyering, and ethics."8 His "project focuses on the rhetoric of race or
'race-talk' in the prosecution and defense of racially motivated violence in
civil and criminal law proceedings."' Using a series of recent, raciallycharged criminal trials, he shows how race casts a powerful shadow,
sometimes to the benefit, but more often to the detriment, of AfricanAmerican defendants and communities.10
Why should anyone, other than outsider scholars and a few wellwishers, welcome Alfieri's project? Mainstream scholars, judges, and
court administrators should attend to the writings of Alfieri and his
colleagues in the clinical theory movement for two reasons: one prudential,
the other jurisprudential. The prudential reason is easily stated: to avoid
condemnation at a later time. As Robert Cover and others have pointed
out, every generation or so the judicial system hands down a decision that
in time seems egregious and inhumane, so that subsequent scholars and
ordinary citizens ask the "How could they?" question of its author."
Cases like Buck v. Bell, 2 Plessy v. Ferguson,3 and the Chinese
Exclusion Case 4 mar the careers of otherwise eminent justices. In our

5. See infra subpart 11(B).
6. Alfieri, Race Trials, supra note 2, at 1294.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1301.
9. Id.
10. See id.at 1323 (describing the trials of Lemrick Nelson).
11. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 197259 (1975) (discussing the judiciary's predominant choice of formalism over morality in slavery
decisions of the mid-nineteenth century); see also infra note 16 and accompanying text.
12. 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (opinion by Justice Holmes upholding the involuntary sterilization of a
mentally retarded woman).
13. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (opinion by Justice Brown holding that "separate but equal" treatment
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
14. 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (opinion by Justice Field upholding a law excluding Chinese laborers
from entering the United States).
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time, we have seen retired judges question their own roles in upholding
sodomy laws.' 5 If the consensus takes a certain form-condemning
homosexuality, for example-it is difficult to perceive how what is written
today may strike a future generation (or even oneself, later) as cruel and
inhumane when the consensus shifts. 6 Who can assert with certainty that
Bowers v. Hardwick 7 and McClesky v. Kemp"8 will not turn out to be
the Dred Scotts'9 of our age, condemned by a later time as barbaric and
wrong? Closely examining how we think, speak, and act in areas such as
race can reduce the chance that history will judge us harshly.
The jurisprudential reason to further the "racialized narrative" inquiry
is that attending to the rhetorical role of race in legal representation and
rules enables us to accommodate change. According to one theory of law

reform, legal decision-making structures ought to be chosen in light of the
stage of social evolution represented by the matter under consideration.'
With cases falling in a zone of moral flux, judges, legislators, and even
legal scholars ought to adopt relatively open rules of discourse and
judgment, assuring that the widest possible range of options are heard and
entertained. 2' Later, once social consensus has emerged over an issue
(such as women's right to work on the same terms as men), cases may be
decided under bright-line rules, with more streamlined treatment.2
Before that time, presumptions should be relaxed, burdens of proof eased,

and limitations on who may speak and about what, kept to a minimum.23

15. See Anadi Agneshwar, Ex-Justice Says He May HaveBeen Wrong, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 5, 1990,
at 3 (noting that Justice Powell later questioned his vote in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
to uphold Georgia's and-sodomy law).
16. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious
MoralError?,69 TEXAs L. REV. 1929, 1930 (1991) (explaining that "these notorious opinions seemed
to their authors unexceptional, natural, 'the truth'").
17. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding as constitutional a Georgia statute, applied to homosexuals,
criminalizing sodomy).
disparities in the application of
18. 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (ruling that statistical evidence of racial
the death penalty in Georgia did not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias in
Georgia's capital-sentencing process and therefore did not violate the Eighth Amendment).
19. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1856) (stating that blacks "are not included, and were not
intended to be included, under the word 'citizen' in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of
the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United
States").
20. See Laurence H. Tribe, StructuralDue Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 298-301
(1975); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1673, 1673-87 (2d ed. 1988)
(developing a "constitutional model designed to match decision structures with substantive human
ends").
21. See Tribe, supra note 20, at 290-93 (suggesting that constitutional principles should be
concerned with the evolution of policy over time).
22. See id. at 290, 314 (noting that the flexible period should last "for a time" and that the "series
of individualized determinations ... may offer a basis for reestablishing a rule ... around a new
consensus").

23. See id. at 287-93, 303-12.
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By maintaining relatively open rules of decision for matters on which
society has yet to reach a consensus, we do ourselves a favor-even if it
means more time and effort for the judicial branch.
Since the meaning of race is a matter of intense concern to society
today, and is likely to remain so as our demography changes and economic
globalization requires dealing with many nonwhite nations, inquiries like
Alfieri's into the way race functions in the legal system will advance
rational decision making. What will this entail? It will require that we
look closely at rules of advocacy and professional responsibility.24 We
must also examine our daily practices when communicating with clients,
in order to see how race advantages some and disadvantages others.' It
counsels that we initially suspend judgment on Paul Butler's proposal to
allow black juries to nullify certain verdicts.' Perhaps this idea will turn
out to bring benefits, while causing few losses. We should be careful not
to paint with too broad a brush, for example by prohibiting all racial
references by lawyers as illegitimateY We should guard against ruling
out statistical proof of discrimination, for example, inthe operation of the
death penalty merely because that discrimination is less than total or
because introducing safeguards in one area might require doing so in others
as well.'
Explorations like Alfieri's can help the law move more
smoothly to the next level, while guarding against damaging errors and
marred reputations.
II.

Broadening the Inquiry

A.

Including Civil Trials in Studies of the Rhetoric of Race

Writers who explore the role of race in trials should expand their
focus to include civil as well as criminal trials. Alfieri says his project is
to lay bare the rhetoric of race in "trials"29 and "representation,"" but
it is clear that he is mainly concerned with criminal trials. 3 This is
understandable, since criminal prosecution is the most graphic coercive

24. Alfieri and others have begun this task. See Alfieri Race Trials, supra note 2, at 1339
(surveying "the regulation of racial bias specific to the prosecution and the defense function").
25. See id. at 1323-39, 1342, 1346-47 (examining the legal strategies used in the trial of Lemrick
Nelson).
26. See Paul Butler, Racially BasedJuryNullification:BlackPowerin the CriminalJusticeSystem,
105 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1995) (positing that in some cases "it is the moral responsibility of black

jurors to emancipate some guilty black outlaws").
27. See Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice:Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the
PrejudiceHabit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 734 (1995) (arguing that forbidding references to race causes
"legal decisionmakers ... [to be] less able to control their discriminatory response").
28. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 315-18 (1987) (warning that requiriug too strict a
standard of justice in capital penalty, cases could result in costly reforms elsewhere).
29. See, e.g., Alfieri, Race Trials, supra note 2, at 1294, 1299, 1301, 1365.
30. See, e.g., id. at 1294, 1299, 1302, 1303.
31. See, e.g., id. at 1326-90 (analyzing the use of racial rhetoric in a criminal trial).
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power of the state. That race plays a role in this arena is also
undeniable-all we have to do is look at the composition of our jails and
penitentiaries.32 But people of color come before the civil courts, too,
probably at least as often as they do criminal courts. They sue or are sued
for divorce, child support, or restraining orders; by landlords for eviction;
and by credit agencies, loan sharks, and installment merchants for
collection or repossession. When this happens, a host of racialized
narratives, substantive laws, remedies, presumptions, and discourse
patterns challenge litigants and their lawyers in the search for justice. 33
The cost of litigation, 34 the geography of remedies, 35 and the
disproportionate shunting of small-stakes claims to deformalized forums 36
are all issues scholars interested in pursuing the role of race in civil settings
should explore.

B. Expanding the Inquiry Beyond the Black-White Paradigmof Race
Alfieri and others who wish to understand the role of racialized
narratives need to expand their gaze to groups beyond blacks. 37 Alfieri

32. See MARK MAUER & TRACY HULING, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL

JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER I (The Sentencing Project ed., 1995) (explaining that one in three
African American males are currently under the supervision of the criminal justice system).
33. A hypothetical example of such a racialized narrative would go as follows: "This plaintiff
claims the merchant misled her, but she's at fault, too. Why don't these people just learn English?"
On the deployment of various racialized narratives in judicial and quasi-judicial settings, see PATRICIA
J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991) and Patricia J. Williams, The Obliging
Shell: An Informal Essay on FormalEqual Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128 (1989).
34. By this I mean filing, service and process fees, counsel fees, and the costs associated with fact
investigation and discovery, all of which can quickly add up to tens of thousands of dollars for even
a fairly simple case. See Deborah M. Shelton, Employment Law, The Maryland Survey: 1995-1996,
56 MD. L. REV. 825, 842 (1997) (explaining that high costs can make litigating wrongful discharge
claims impossible).
35. For example, provisional (or pre-judgment) remedies such as replevin, unlawful detainer, and
garnishment are commonly used by loan sharks and credit merchants seeking speedy relief-but are not
available to plaintiffs such as mothers of children injured by defective products such as infant safety
belts. See JOHN J. COUND Er AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 219, 219-44 (7th ed.
1997) (examining limitations on the use of provisional rcmedies imposed by the Due Process Clause).
36. Many scholars chide the use of informal forums. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairnessand
Formality:Minimizing the Risk of Prejudicein Alternative DisputeResolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359,
1391-99 (arguing that alternative systems of dispute resolution may be injurious to minorities); Trina
Grillo, The MediationAlternative: ProcessDangersfor Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1549-50 (1991)
(criticizing the use of mediation as an alternative to the adversary system in custody disputes).
37. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino-Critical
Scholarship, and the Black-White Binary, 75 TEXAS L. REV. 1181, 1196-97 (1997) (book review)
(arguing that the black-white paradigm has doctrinal, conceptual, and real-world consequences which
limit the way we think of race and racism); Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigmof Race:
The "NormalScience"of American RacialThought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213, 1214-15 (1997) (criticizing
the black-white paradigm as exclusive and limiting in racial discourse, especially with respect to
Latinos).
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writes that race, in general, is his object of attention,38 yet his article

focuses on just one racial minority group: blacks.39

But Latinos and

Asians (to take two examples) are not, however, merely African Americans
with slightly lighter skins. Mainstream society has racialized Latinos and

Asians differently from African Americans. Skin color comes into play,
of course, but so does discrimination based on accent,' national origin
or immigrant status, 4' religion,4 2 and culture.43
The invidious
stereotypes that afflict these groups differ as well,' so that jury selection
and voir dire strategies necessary to assure a fair trial must take different
approaches. A lawyer familiar with advocacy on behalf of blacks will
recognize the racialized narratives of danger, threat, and animality,45 but
might fail to recognize, and counter, Chicano or Asian racial narratives.
Alfieri and other clinical theorists must expand beyond their current

Afrocentric focus for another reason. Preoccupation with a single racial
minority group can easily end up slighting, or even affirmatively harming,
another. For example, while American society was celebrating Brown v.
Board of Education,' a justly deserved victory for black school children,
Congress was ordering "Operation Wetback," a massive roundup of

Chicanos, many of whom were American citizens, for deportation to
Mexico.47 Two years later, an article appeared in Duke Law School's
Journal of Law and Contemporary Problems about the so-called "wetback

38. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text; see also Alfieri, Race Trials, supra note 2, at
1295, 1294-95 (characterizing the race theory used in his analysis of trials as seeking "to develop a
color-conscious, pluralistic approach to advocacy that honors the integrity of diverse . . racial
identities").
39. See, e.g., Alfieri, Race Trials, supra note 2, at 1305, 1307-08, 1313, 1318-19, 1322-39,
1342, 1353. Other groups rate barely a mention. See id. at 1307 n.79, 1310 nn.94, 102.
40. See generally Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, AntidiscriminationLaw, and a
Jurisprudencefor the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991).
41. See Michael A. Olivas, Unaccompanied Refugee Children:Detention, Due Process, and
Disgrace,2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 159, 163 (1990) (arguing that the Immigration and Naturalization
Service "has acted aggressively to deny detained aliens their few rights, has defied court orders to
administer the laws more conscientiously, and has created a system that terrorizes and coerces children
into conceding their legal claims"); Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice:Reevaluating "National
Origin- DiscriminationUnder Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1994) (describing workplace
occurrences of national origin discrimination despite Title VII's prohibition against such discrimination).
42.

See ROBERT ALAN GOLDBERG, HOODED EMPIRE: THE KU KLUX KLAN IN COLORADO 164-65

(1981) (noting discrimination against Catholic Latinos in the Southwest).
43. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and
Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1273-75
(1992) (tracing Mexican-American stereotypes from the U.S. seizure of Mexican territory in the
Southwest to World War II).
45. See id. at 1262-67 (providing a historical account of African-American stereotypes beginning
with the U.S. slave trade):
46. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Race, The ImmigrationLaws, and Domestic Race Relations:A
"MagicMirror"into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1138 (1998) (describing workplace
occurrences of national origindiscrimination despite Title VIl's prohibition against such discrimination).
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problem," approving the government's mass deportation program.' Only
a few years earlier, a presidential decree had ordered all Japanese
Americans living on the West Coast to relocate to wartime detention
camps, where they spent the war years behind barbed wire, many losing
farms and businesses.4 9 Korematsu v. United States," which approved
this wartime internment, was decided only ten years before Brown.
Reconstruction, a time of great gains for blacks, coincided with the
enactment of anti-Asian immigration laws, in part as a sop to white
southerners who were concerned that caste might turn out to mean
nothing." In Mississippi, planters refused to rehire the newly freed
blacks; instead they brought in Mexicans and Asians. 2 During World
War II, we were somewhat more generous toward domestic minorities such
as blacks and Mexicans, but turned our backs on Jews fleeing the
Holocaust.5 3
Ignoring racialization of one group can also positively injure another.
For example, in the wake of Brown, school authorities in Texas and the
Southwest certified certain schools as desegregated on the ground that they
were fifty percent Mexican and fifty percent black.' In a similar vein,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in the same year as Brown, rejected
a Latino's claim of a racially stacked jury, composed of all whites, on the
ground that Mexicans are members of the white race.'5 Cases having to
do with interpreters 6 and class suits 7 also contain "racialized
narratives" or racialized treatment of Latino Americans, all of which might
be unrecognizable to a lawyer not trained to look for them. A lawyer who
thinks, "Oh, well, I deal mostly with one group (say, blacks); I'll postpone
coming to terms with the Chicano or the Asian situation" can end up doing
a disservice to both groups.

48. See Eleanor M. Hadley, A CriticalAnalysis of the Wetback Problem, 21 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 334, 350-51 (1956) (describing the roundup as necessary in order to bring illegal immigration
under control).
49. See Johnson, supra note 47, at 1125.
50. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
51. See Johnson, supra note 47, at 1123.
52. See Telephone Interview with Juan F. Perea, Professor of Law, University of Florida (Oct.

20, 1998); see also Bill Ong Hing, The Immigrant as Criminal: Punishing Dreamers, 9 HASINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 79, 87 (1998) (noting that "[a]fter the Civil War some Southern plantation owners
seriously considered replacing their former slaves with Chinese Labor").
53. See Hing, supra note 52, at 89, 94 (describing U.S. efforts to recruit Mexican laborers during
the 1930s and 1940s, and the concurrent refusal to relax immigration restrictions for European Jews).
54. See George A. Martinez, Mexican Americans and Whiteness, in THE LATINO/A CONDMON:
A CRrITcAL READER 175 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998) [hereinafter THE LATINO/A
CONDMON].
55. See Hernandez v. Texas, 251 S.W.2d 531 (1952), rev'd, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
56. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
57. See, e.g., Tijerina v. Henry, 48 F.R.D. 274(1969). On whether Mexican Americans can sue
as a legally cognizable class, see Richard Delgado & Vicky Palacios, MexicanAmericans as a Legally
CognizableClass underRule 23 and the Equal ProtectionClause, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 393 (1975).
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Just as the medical profession cannot ignore how race and ethnic status

affect a group's access to health care, as well as their risk of occupational
accidents or diseases such as skin cancer, high blood pressure, and
diabetes,58 lawyers must understand how different groups are at risk of
discriminatory treatment by society and the courts. The Supreme Court, by

imposing such barriers as burden of proof, intent requirements, tight chains
of causation, and limitations on who can sue for what, makes it dauntingly
difficult for a prototypical black plaintiff to recover for discrimination.59
But the limitations the legal system imposes on Hispanics, for example, are
different, and in some cases, harder to surmount.' What one learns from

advocacy on behalf of one group does not transfer automatically into
informed advocacy on behalf of another.

Sensitization to the narrative of race regarding one group thus does
little when one is representing another group. That other group may
present entirely new challenges, including recognizing how foreign
language competency, court translators, the fear of deportation,
discrimination based on accent and body language, and religiously based
reluctance to sue all factor in.6 Even a seemingly neutral rule, such as
a university's requirement that undergraduates spend their first year living
on campus in a dormitory, can have a tremendous impact on racial

minority communities. 61

New lines of scholarship, 63 including

58. See ARMANDO B. RENDON, CHICANO MANiFESo 92 (1971) (noting that Mexican Americans
suffer from a disproportionately high rate of infant death).
59. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo'sBookbag:Brimelow,Bork, Hernstein,MurrayandD'SouzaRecent Conservative Thought and the End of Equality, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1929, 1937 (1998)
(considering these and other door-closing rulings).
60. For example, are Latinos even a legally cognizable class? See Delgado & Palacios, supra note
57, at 393 (arguing that even in the wake of the intensive civil rights movement, Chicanos are not a
legally cognizable class). Are they entitled to serve on juries if they speak Spanish in addition to
English? See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1991) (holding that it is not a per se
violation of the Equal Protection Clause to exercise a peremptory strike against individuals who do not
convincingly agree to disregard Spanish testimony in favor of the English translation). Can even the
way they look hurt them? See Ann T. Greeley et al., What's in a Face?, CCM: THE AMER. LAW.
CORP. COuNS. MAG., Oct. 1998, at 64.
61. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
62. At my own campus, this rule operates as a powerful deterrent for minorities considering
college, and not only because of the cost. Many minority parents in Denver, only 30 miles from
campus, would permit their daughters and sons to commute but hesitate to let them live in a dorm
dominated by animal-house behavior. Others need the high-achieving high school graduate to live at
home to serve as a role model and surrogate parent for younger siblings, who may be experimenting
with drugs and gangs. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Home-Grown Racism: Colorado's
HistoricProvision-andDenial-ofHigherEducation
EqualOpportunity, 70 COLO. LAW. (forthcoming
1999) (discussing the impact of this rule on the minority community).
63. See, e.g., Berta Esperance Hernr.ndez-Truyol, Borders (En)Gendered:Normatives, Latinas,
and a Latcrit Paradigm,72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 882 (1997); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Beyond Black and
White: Racializing Asian Americans in a Society Obsessed with O.J., 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 165
(1995). See generally Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship:CriticalRace
Theory, Post-Structuralism,and NarrativeSpace, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1241 (1993) (discussing the new
lines of Asian-American critical legal scholarship).
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and anthologies,6 allow scholars interested in tracing the

rich tapestry of race to come to terms with it in all its multiplicity.
Social scientists know that when two minority groups of color co-exist

in the same region, white folks often "make pets" of one-ordinarily the
numerically smaller, less threatening group-at the expense of the other.'
Members of the smaller group may be offered positions as overseers, or
nominated to positions such as personnel director or director of human
relations or college admissions.67 They thus unwittingly contribute to the

oppression of the other minority group. Everyone, even good white
liberals like Alfieri, must beware of this tendency. The country's
demographics are changing; the number of blacks and Hispanics are now
nearly equal.6 8 In parts of the country, blacks predominate; in other
parts, Latinos are more numerous.69 In many areas, Asians are the
fastest-growing minority.7' Because of the different experiences, methods
of racial identification, and histories of each minority group, it is not

possible to properly understand different racial minorities by merely
analogizing from what one has learned about others. Any particular racial
narrative might be authentic as applied to one racial minority, but not so
when applied to another. One who wishes to count himself a race reformer

ignores this complexity at his or her peril.
C.

White Narrativesand Racialized Rhetoric

As recent writing demonstrates, white folks have a race too, although
they rarely think about it or see themselves as racialized. 71 By the same
token, they sometimes speak in racialized narratives about themselves,

64. See, e.g., JuAN F. PEREA Er AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND MATERIALS FOR A

MULTIRACIAL AMERICA (forthcoming 1999).
65. See, e.g., THE LATINOIA CONDITION, supra note 54.
66. See Bob Ewegen, HispanicCandidatesFace Uphill Climb, DENV. POST, May 4, 1998, at B 11.
67. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo'sFourteenthChronicle:AmericanApocalypse, 32 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 275,294 (1997) (comparing American Latinos with South African "coloreds," who were
offered positions as clerks and overseers in the apartheid regime); see also Kathleen Morris, Through
the Looking Glass: Recent Developments in Affirmative Action, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 182, 188
(1996) (noting that in 1990, Latinos in California held 9.56% of available management jobs while
blacks held only 5.1%).
68. See Robert S. Chang & Keith Aoki, Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/National
Imagination, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1395, 1407 (1997) (noting that the United States' population is 9.5%
Hispanic and 11.8% black).
69. See Rachel F. Moran, What ifLatinos Really Matteredin the PublicPolicy Debate?, 85 CAL.
L. REV. 1315, 1316 & n.4 (1997) (discussing Latinos' displacement of blacks as the largest minority
group in some areas, such as Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, South Dakota, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming).
70. See Chang & Aoki, supranote 68, at 1423 (presenting the ethnic make-up of Monterrey Park,
California, where Asians and Pacific Islanders constitute 57.5% of the population).
71. On the recent "whiteness movement," see CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE
MIRROR (Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic eds., 1997).
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although the narratives are so familiar that they strike both the speaker and
the listener not as narratives at all, but the truth. One narrative that may
be familiar to readers is that of white innocence, often counterposed against
the narrative of black imposition. Thomas Ross has identified and written
about these narratives in connection with the debate over affirmative
action.'
Another is what I might call white fatalism: "Oh, I'd never
challenge that white cop, even though I know he's lying. It would just
inflame the white jury."73 Terms and narratives such as color blindness
and merit also contain a white-coded dimension almost impossible to escape
once one analyzes their meanings and deployment.74 It will be helpful to
consider two further narratives whose racial character-and white
valence-are less obvious: free speech and antidiversity. These narratives
often appear in debates about hate speech and affirmative action in higher
education, where their white race-coding is rarely perceived or challenged.
1. Free Speech.-In the controversy over hate speech and crimes, and
to some degree that over-regulation of sexual harassment and pornography,
a free-speech narrative is often deployed in a way that advances and
encodes white privilege, while cutting short discussion of countervailing
equality values.7'
For example, opinions striking down campus hate
speech codes, which are used to deter racist speech and insults at
universities, often proceed in strict First Amendment terms," as though
these cases were not about race and racism but rather the free speech right
of the bigot. Justice Scalia's opinion in R.A.V v. St. Paul, Minnesota
illustrates this exposition of one narrative at the expense of the other-he
72. See Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297 (1990); The
Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and Black Abstraction, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. I
(1990).
73. White fatalism recognizes and condemns actors like the lying police officer-but nevertheless
gives in to them as inevitable. On the general presumption of white truthfulness and validity, see
generally STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES
AMERICA (1996); on the way this plays out in police encounters, see KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE
COLOR OF CRIME 33-46 (1998) (examining how different races have divergent perspectives concerning
police abuse).
74. See Richard Delgado, Rodigo's Tenth Chronicle:MeritandAffirmativeAction, 83 GEo. L.J.
1711, 1718, 1718-19 (1995) (arguing that merit functions both as a justification to the socially elite
class for its position and as a "resource attractor," allowing members of the socially elite class "to
purchase more increments of merit for themselves and their children"); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of
"Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1991) (book review) ("A color-blind
interpretation of the Constitution legitimates, and thereby maintains, the social, economic, and political
advantages that whites hold over other Americans.").
75. See Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: ConstitutionalNarratives in Collision, 85
Nw. U. L. REV. 343, 346-48 (1991) (discussing these two opposing narratives).
76. See, e.g., UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163
(E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
77. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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expounds at length on the free speech aspects of the controversy," while
devoting scant attention to the interest of the black family in not having a
cross burned on its lawn late at night.79 The narrative of racial terrorism
is virtually missing from this opinion, as it is in the campus hate speech
cases.' It is as though an unspoken meta-narrative told judges: "the First
Amendment is our narrative; emphasize that one and the case will come
out the way we want." Interestingly, a tort approach to remedying hate
speech works better."1 Many plaintiffs of color have been awarded tort
damages for insulting speech under such doctrines as intentional infliction
of emotional distress, defamation, assault, and battery.' Perhaps tort law
has a more egalitarian, populist cast that enables judges to redress more
easily the dimension of racial oppression and outrage these cases present.
Tort laws, unlike campus speech codes, apply across-the-board, so that a
plaintiff of any color subjected to intentional infliction of emotional
distress, for example, will be able to sue for damages.
2. Remedies for Historic Racial Wrongs: The Case of Affirmative
Action.-Consider how whiteness plays an unexpressed but powerful role
in discussion of affirmative action remedies. In a familiar story, opponents
of affirmative action argue that racial preferences (1) stigmatize their
beneficiaries and (2) are unfair to innocent whites, constituting reverse
discrimination and legitimizing the role of groups.A To see the racial
coding and white valence in this narrative, consider a rarely broached
counternarrative that addresses the same concerns. That counternarrative
holds that racial isolation is at least as great a problem for the nonwhite
professional as racial stigma, and that fairness and social utility cut in favor
of affirmative action.
According to economic theory, the quality of goods and services ought
to go up, not down, when previously excluded groups are granted entry

78. See id. at 391, 391-92 (asserting that the St. Paul ordinance banning hate speech violates the
First Amendment by endorsing viewpoint discrimination, "impos[ing] special prohibitions on those
speakers who express views on disfavored subjects").
79. See id. at 395 (favoring protections against "the danger of censorship" over the argument that
the St. Paul ordinance "ensure[d] the basic human rights of members of groups that have historically
been subjected to discrimination, including the right to live in peace where they wish").
80. See UMWPost, 774 F. Supp. at 1172 (declaring the University of Wisconsin's regulation of
hate speech unconstitutional because it was not limited to hate speech that "tend[ed] to incite violent
reaction"); Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 868 ("While the Court is sympathetic to the University's obligation
to ensure equal education opportunities for all of its students, such efforts must not be at the expense

of free speech.").
81. See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 146-49 (1982) (hypothesizing that creation of a tort
action to combat hate speech may reduce the use of racial insults as a result of societal desire to
conform to the law).

82. See id. at 150-65.
83. See Delgado, supra note 74, at 1719-20, 1728-29.
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into schools and workplaces-something a recent book by two former
university presidents has documentedS4-while the opposite should happen
when the majority group favors its own through old-boy networks,
nepotism, and slanted standardized testsY A prime example of the oldboy network working against economic theory is Harvard and Yale's
admission preference for "legacy" candidates. 6
This counternarrative is potentially as potent and grounded in "the
truth" as the one conservatives deploy (stigma, incompetence), yet one
hears it only rarely. Why? Because the more common narrative resonates
with the way whites choose to see the world and comforts them. In this
sense, the more common narrative is a white narrative. Alfieri and those
working to understand racial narratives must not ignore white narratives.
Indeed, excessive preoccupation with the way people of color are spoken
of and constructed, without similar attention to the narratives of unjustified
white privilege and oppression, can end up harming minority groups.
I. How Careless and One-Sided Rhetorical Analysis Can Injure Oppressed
Groups.
My analysis so far suggests that the rhetorical analysis of race is
capable of doing a great deal of good, but needs to be expanded beyond its
current narrow compass. What will happen if it does not, continuing to
examine only narratives of black oppression in the context of criminal race
trials? To see how monocular vision can end up harming a group, consider
what happened to Mexican Americans at two points in their history.
From 1890 to 1920, millions of poor immigrants from southern and
eastern Europe came to the U.S. to work in factories and on farmsY
Within a short time, a small army of social workers descended on them,
establishing settlement houses and schools.' The social workers taught
the immigrants useful skills, such as speaking English, learning how to fill
out a job application, personal hygiene, how to dress, and American

84. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIvER 12 (1998) (listing the

benefits of minority participation in businesses and professions, including increased recruitment of
minority customers and healthier corporations).
85. See RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE (1994) (reviewing

purported differences in job performance between affirmative action hirees and non-affirmative-action
hirees in teaching and law enforcement).
86. See John D. Lamb, The RealAffirmative Action Babies:Legacy Preferences at Harvardand
Yale, 26 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 491 (1993) and Deborah Brandt, Affirmative Action for Whites
at the University of Wisconsin, J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC., winter 1998/99, at 127.
87. See Joe R. Feagin, Old Poison in New Bottles: The Deep Roots of Modern Nativism, in
CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES 348, 349-50 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997).
88. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo'sEleventh Chronicle:Empathy andFalseEmpathy, 84 CAL.
L. REV. 61, 70-71 (1996).
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cuisine-even though the new citizens had perfectly adequate recipes and
diets. 9
When the wave of immigration ended in the early 1920s, the social
worker industry suddenly was without work. Accordingly, schools of
social work rapidly switched their attention to the domestic Latino
population, designating it the new problem group.' Books, master's, and
Ph.D. dissertations on Mexicans proliferated, and America learned, for the
first time, that it had a "Mexican problem. " 91 A similar story played
itself out in the Southwest a few decades later. A liberal Colorado mayor,
Quigg Newton, concerned about racism against Latinos in the Denver area,
convened a blue-ribbon commission that included community leaders and
academics.Y The commission issued a number of reports that began by
condemning social discrimination against the Latino population of Denver,
but also went on to insist that the Chicanos had themselves to blame for
part of their problem. 3 Learned sociologists wrote that the Mexicans
were afflicted by fatalism, lack of achievement orientation, and a "mafiana"
attitude. 4 Chicano families did too little to keep their children clean,
well-clothed, and motivated to succeed in school. 95 In a short time,
Chicanos went from being a small, hard-working, largely invisible minority
group, trying desperately to scratch out a living in a hostile land, to a
"problem group"-much worse off as a result of the Mayor's well-meaning
efforts. A wide-ranging study of the problems of all minority groups of
color, or of all poor farm-workers, might have avoided this assault.
IV. Conclusion
Latinos are being short-changed by the judicial system-even by their
own lawyers-because racist treatment and deployment of racialized
narratives against them are often not recognized as such. Focusing on the
racialization of one group, without similar attention to that of others, may

89. See id. at 70.
90. See Cary McWilliams, The Mexican Problem, in LATINO/A CONDITION, supranote 54, at 196.
91. See id. at 196-97.
92. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 62; Tom I. Romero II, No More Mafiana for the Queen:
The Commission on Human Relations, Mexican Americans and Racial Consciousness in Denver, 19471965, at 5 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Texas Law Review).
93. See DENVER AREA WELFARE COUNCIL INC., THE SPANISH-AMERICAN POPULATION IN

DENVER: AN EXPOLORATORY SURVERY 36-38, 106 (1950) (attributing the school drop-out rates among
Latino children to a cultural view that "the future is of little importance").
94. See R. W. ROSKELLEY, WHEN DIFFERENT CULTURES MEET: AN ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION OF SOME PROBLEMS ARISING WHEN PEOPLE OF SPANISH AND NORTH EUROPEAN

CULTURES ATrEMPT TO LIVE TOGETHER 25-35 (1949).
95. See id. at 23, 32.
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end up harming both groups. Achieving whatever clarity is possible on the
way race operates to constrain choices and limit trial possibilities benefits
the legal system by opening it up to change and reform. It also helps
against what Jean Stefancic and I have called "serious moral
guard 96
error."
Alfieri's inquiry needs to expand to include civil trials and groups
other than African Americans. It must also attend to narratives of
whiteness, white privilege, and unjustified white superiority. As Adrienne
Davis has put it, racism is like a hydra-headed monster. 7 One head is
outright oppression of people of color; another is white privilege. If we
scrupulously confront ill treatment of the first kind, but allow the second
to continue unchecked, the system of white-over-brown supremacy will
remain roughly intact. Trial outcomes and the racial composition of our
jails will be the same as before. Racism is a system of interlocking
privileges and oppression, all of which must be addressed systematically
and simultaneously, and in all their aspects, or progress will be halting and
slow.

96. Delgado & Stefancie, supra note 16, at 1932.
97. See Adrienne D. Davis, Identity Notes Part One: Playing in the Light, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
695, 709 n.51 (1996).

